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ABSTRACT 
The study constructs a linear model to evaluate the significant impacts of bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) on foreign direct investment (FDI) and the possible 
consequences of BITs. The results show that BITs have significantly promoted FDI, and 
their effects are substitute for the level of political risk in a country. Another interesting 
finding is that BITs signed with non-OECD countries should not be overlooked. By 
estimating the growth of FDI resulting from an additional BIT ratified, the finding 
further indicates that BITs are more potential for most Asian countries to promote FDI. 
On average, a BIT ratified by a country in South, East, and South-East Asia can raise 
FDI by around 2.3 percent. 
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Introduction 
Designing a favorable policy to attract foreign investors has become one of the hottest 
topics among developing countries. Several national and international policies which are 
being pursued include the removal of investment restrictions, the establishment of investment 
law, the establishment of commercial zones, the provision of tax holidays, bilateral 
agreements and economic integration. Among these policies, the negotiation of bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) has been witnessed on an upsurge trend in the 1990s. According to 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) BITs Database 2005, 
the number of BITs increased from 385 in 1989 to 2,392 by 2004, including 176 countries 
(see Figure 1). For instance, China, which is the first developing country to sign the greatest 
number of BITs since 1986, has attracted a huge amount of FDI accounting for about half of 
total FDI flows into Asia.  
A bilateral investment treaty is generally known as an agreement between two 
signatory countries providing investors with fair and equitable treatment and legal protection. 
The growth of BITs has been discussed actively as one of the developing countries’ FDI 
policies in the journals of international law (eg. Salacuse, 1990). This has important 
economic implications as several studies are going on to investigate the determinants of FDI. 
To date, only a few studies have been conducted solely to examine the relationship between 
BITs and FDI. Elkins, Guzman and Simmons (2004) point out that developing countries 
under competitive economic pressures are rushing to sign BITs to capture the share of foreign 
investment. In addition, Salacuse and Sullivan (2005) employ a cross-section estimation to 
examine the impact of BITs signed by nearly 100 developing countries with the U.S. and 
with OECD countries in the year 1998, 1999 and 2000, separately. Banga (2003) investigates 
the impacts of national and international policies of South, East, and South-East Asian 
countries to promote FDI; and BITs are one of important variables in his study. 
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While viewed as an FDI policy to attract foreign investment, BITs have been used by 
developing countries in an attempt to signal multinational enterprises (MNEs) that they are 
committed to providing protection and guarantees. Theoretically, BITs play the role as a 
substitute for the quality of institutions or the political risk in a developing country. That is, 
riskier countries tend to absorbed more FDI inflows when their commitments to protect 
investors are credible. In this sense, among the three studies there is only one study whose 
findings are consistent with the theoretical expectation of BITs. 
Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005) are unable to provide evidence for this theoretical 
expectation in their study in both general and bilateral analysis of BITs with the U.S. They 
include 63 countries in the general analysis and 54 in the bilateral analysis; however, the 
regressions in their study seem to suffer from the simultaneity problem between one control 
variable (economic growth) and the dependent variable (share of FDI). Similar results are 
obtained by Hallward-Driemeier (2003) in the study of bilateral FDI flows from 20 OECD 
countries to developing countries in the period from 1980 to 2000.  
Unlike the earlier studies, Neumayer and Spess (2005) confirm the theoretical 
expectation with fixed-effect regressions of FDI on the one-year lag of cumulative BITs with 
OECD countries. They expand the number of observations to include 119 countries. 
However, the cumulative number of BITs signed among developing countries is excluded 
under the assumption that the amount of FDI flows between developing countries is 
negligible. They suggest that the studies of Hallward-Driemeier (2003) and Tobin and 
Rose-Ackerman (2005) do not generate the theoretical expectation due to the low number of 
observations. 
In contrast, by using a sample of only 10 countries in South, East, and South-East Asia, 
the present study confirms the theoretical expectations of BITs. The findings suggest that 
BITs are more credible in a riskier country to attract FDI inflows. Using the composite 
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political risk index in 2004, the study predicts the growth rate of FDI due to one additional 
BIT ratified. The results show that it is not necessary for countries such as Brunei, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan to use BITs to signal foreign investors. 
As BITs between developing Asian countries dramatically rose in the 1990s, the main 
objective of this study is to empirically show the possible consequences of BITs. More 
precisely, we attempt to show that BITs signal not only bilaterally to investors of the 
signatory country, but also to the world business community as a whole, and to prove the 
theoretical expectation. Additionally, we also attempt to confirm that BITs between 
non-OECD countries are significant. As BITs signal to investors worldwide, the effects of 
BITs between non-OECD countries may not be neglected. 
The remaining sections of the study are organized as follows. Section 2 provides the 
definition, provisions, and movement of BITs. Section 3 reviews the literature on the 
relationship between BITs and FDI while section 4 presents the methodology used in the 
study. The empirical results are discussed in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes the 
findings together with policy implications. 
 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) 
Bilateral investment treaties are commonly known as agreements between two 
signatories in order to provide legal standards of protection for foreign investors. This legal 
protection is a supplementary offer provided for the signatory countries other than those 
specified in the national laws. Similar to the national laws, the treaty needs to be ratified to 
come into effect. According to Salacuse (1990), the basic structure of any BIT encompasses 
eight topics: 
1. Scope of application 
2. Conditions for the entry of foreign investment 
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3. General Standards of Treatment of Foreign Investments 
4. Monetary transfers 
5. Operational conditions of the investment 
6. Protection against expropriation and dispossession 
7. Compensation for losses 
8. Investment dispute settlement 
Basically, BITs vary across countries. They differ according to negotiations between 
countries; nevertheless, they share a common provision in which investors are entitled to fair 
and equitable treatment from the signatory governments. That is, there is no discrimination 
against foreign investors. The treatment is also applicable to the protection against 
expropriation and the mechanism of dispute settlement. BITs typically provide dispute 
resolution by an international body. That is, investors can sue the national government at the 
international arbitration if there is any violation of the treaty. 
Historically, BITs was initiated and promoted by the capital-exporting countries. The 
objective was to establish an international legal framework to protect the investment of their 
nationals in foreign countries. On the other hand, the driving forces, at present, seem to be 
from the developing countries. BITs today are being promoted by developing countries as 
one of their investment policies. The objective of negotiating a BIT with advanced countries 
is to enhance the investment climate, making the countries more attractive to foreign 
investors by assuring investors of the government efforts to protect them. 
Since the first BIT was signed in 1959 between Germany and Pakistan, the number of 
BITs increased gradually, and rapidly especially in the 1990s. This trend can also be observed 
in some Asian nations (see Figure 2). Before the 1990s, few developing countries signed 
BITs; however, there was a dramatic increase in the 1990s (see Figure 3) and BITs between 
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developing Asian and Pacific countries accounted for the largest portion during the time. 
Therefore, the effects of BITs among these countries should not be neglected. 
 
Literature Review on BITs and FDI 
Besides the characteristics of the host country per se, the government of developing 
countries have targeted FDI as the main factor for their economic growth. In that respect, 
those countries have established law of foreign investment in order to provide incentives as 
well as guarantees to make their countries even more attractive to foreign investors. At the 
same time, some countries have negotiated bilaterally with other countries to establish a legal 
framework aimed directly at attracting investment from the signatory countries through 
provision with protection and guarantees.  
As various policies to attract FDI inflows have been introduced by most developing 
countries, several researchers have examined the role of those policies in attracting FDI (see 
Banga, 2003; Blonigen & Davies, 2002; Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier & Mengistae, 2004; 
Neumayer, 2006; Taylor, 2000). On the other hand, there are few studies investigating the 
in-depth relationship between BITs and FDI, and their findings are very much controversial. 
UNCTAD (2003) states that there is nothing much BITs can influence the global FDI 
flows. However, this argument may set a gap that BITs may work in certain conditions and 
for specific nations and play apart as a favorable framework to welcome foreign investors. 
This appears to support Salacuse (1990) who argues that the adoption of a BIT by a host 
country is, at least, to signal the nationals of a partner country that their investments are 
protected and promoted.  
To prove this statement, Salacuse and Sullivan (2005) conducted a cross-sectional 
empirical analysis on the impacts of U.S. BITs and OECD BITs in developing countries. 
They find a strong positive relationship between BITs and FDI from the U.S. to developing 
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countries, but BITs with OECD counties are not significant. However, using twenty years of 
bilateral FDI flows from 20 OECD countries to 31 developing countries, Hallward-Driemeier 
(2003) finds that BITs play a minor role in stimulating greater FDI and they are only effective 
in countries with high quality of institutions and strong local property rights.  
However, Neumayer and Spess (2005) find a completely different result suggesting that 
signing BITs with OECD countries is important to induce greater FDI inflows into the 
developing countries (see also Egger & Pfaffermayr, 2004). Using three components of 
political risk index developed by International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), they find that a 
country with relatively lower institutional quality benefits more from BITs i.e. BITs act as a 
substitute rather than a complement to the quality of a country’s institutions. However, BITs 
signed with developing countries are excluded in their study due to little amount of FDI flows 
between developing countries. 
Examining BITs signed with the U.S., Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005) find little 
evidence to explain the importance of BITs signed by low and middle-income countries with 
the U.S. in their bilateral analysis. In the general analysis, they argue that BITs only play a 
major role in countries where investment environment has already been improved; their study 
seems to be consistent with Hallward-Driemeier (2003). Using the aggregate index of ICRG 
political risk rating1, they point out that BITs have a positive impact when the political risk is 
equal to 65 or above. 
The contrasting findings of the previous studies might result from econometric methods 
and model specifications employed. For example, Salacuse and Sullivan (2005) do not 
capture social variables such as wage and quality of infrastructure. Thus, their regressions 
may suffer from omitted variable problems. On the other hand, Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 
(2005) include several variables discussed in the literature on determinants of FDI and 
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attempt to correct for the causality between FDI and BIT; however, it seems that they fail to 
solve the endogeneity problem of the GDP growth variable. 
The above studies mainly investigate the importance of BITs of the U.S. and OECD 
countries with all developing countries as a whole while only one study conducted by Banga 
(2003) has investigated the government policies towards FDI in South, East, and South-East 
Asian countries. His study also incorporates BIT variable as one of the policy variables. 
Using data from 15 developing countries in South, East, and South-East Asia in the period 
from 1980 to 1999, he finds significant relationship between BITs and FDI inflows. He 
further argues that BITs with developed countries play major roles while those with 
developing countries seem not to gain statistical significance. Yet, Banga do not examine the 
conditional effect of BITs which is theoretically expected to be a substitute for political risk 
in a country. 
 
Methodology 
To construct the regression models employed in the study, we initially review the 
theoretical and empirical arguments that specify the significant factors affecting FDI flows; 
thereby, the impacts of BITs on FDI can be robustly evaluated in the regressions which 
incorporate all the significant control variables. 
Several theoretical foundations have emerged to explain the reasons why national firms 
turn into multinational enterprises (MNEs) and why they invest in international production 
rather than licensing or exporting. Under the assumption of market imperfection, Hymer 
(1976) stressed the firms’ motives to enhance their market power as the determinants of 
foreign direct investment. Two main types of determinants are firms’ specific advantages and 
removal of conflict. Based on the comprehensive analysis of ownership advantages, the 
advantages of locational specific endowments and the advantages of internalization, which 
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are known as eclectic theory, Dunning (1981) argues that location specific endowments affect 
country or industry variables and their effect is different from the ownership advantages. 
Unlike specific-firm advantages and the advantages of internalization, the locational 
advantages represents advantages specific to a country which are in the interests of foreign 
investors. Empirical frameworks have been conducted to test the attractiveness of a country 
or the determinants of inbound FDI.  
Several country-specific variables have been considered in promoting foreign 
investment. While the economic and political factors are found to be significant to attract 
inbound FDI in various studies (Baniak, Cukrowski & Herczynski, 2005; Ok, 2004), Root 
and Ahmed (1979) investigated the significance of 38 variables which are categorized into 3 
groups described as economic, social, and political variables. Thus, the model formulated to 
investigate the determinants of inbound FDI can be written as: 
 
FDI = f [(Economic Variables), (Social Variables), (Political Variables)] 
 
The economic variables, social variables and political variables to be employed in this 
study are presented as follows: 
 
Economic variables include market size, exchange rate, macroeconomic instability and 
degree of openness. Firstly, to capture the market size the study uses the natural log of real 
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) to measure the current market size and real GDP growth 
to measure the potential market size (see Root & Ahmed, 1979). It is believed that the larger 
the market size, the more potential investment environment to be invested by a 
market-seeking MNEs. Thereby, positive effects are expected for these two variables. 
The second variable to be used in the economic variable category is exchange rate. 
Dunning and Lundan (1997) and Froot and Stein (1989) maintain that the depreciation of the 
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host country’s domestic currency reduces the cost of investment; thus, inspiring foreign 
acquisition of domestic firms. At the same time, exchange rate depreciation also worsens the 
value of the repatriated profits of foreign investors (Singh & Jun, 1995). Therefore, the 
relationship between exchange rate and FDI is ambiguous. In the estimation, this variable 
takes the annual percentage change in real exchange rate.  
The third economic variable is macroeconomic instability. Naturally, investors are 
reluctant to invest their capital in a country with unsound macroeconomic conditions. Hence, 
macroeconomic instability is expected to negatively affect FDI inflows. Inflation (CPI) can 
be regarded as an indicator of macroeconomic instability. 
The last economic variable is trade openness. There are inconclusive findings on the 
relationship between the openness of a host country and inbound FDI. Mundell (1957) 
assumes that trade is the perfect substitute for capital movements in the absence of trade 
barriers. Recent studies have also proved the relationship as either substitute in the case of 
tariff-jumping investment or complement in the case of intra-firm trade (see Banga, 2003). 
Edwards (1990) argues that opening up international trade improves the attractiveness to 
foreign investors. Thus, the impact of this variable is ambiguous. The variable is proxied by 
the ratio of trade to GDP.  
Many studies have found that countries which prove lower costs of investment and 
operation seem to be able to absorb more FDI inflows, especially efficiency and 
resource-seeking FDI. The study uses three proxies to control for the social factors. First of 
all, real wage (constant 2000 US$) in manufacturing is used to capture the host country’s 
labor cost. It is expected to have negative relationship with FDI inflows although 
controversial findings have been revealed (see Chakrabarti, 2001). The logarithm form is 
taken to reduce the skewness in the distribution across countries. 
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The second social variable is the cost of capital. The proxy used is real interest rate 
(base 2000) which hypothesizes to be also negatively related with FDI inflows. The other 
cost related variable is the quality of infrastructure. The proxy is fixed line and mobile phone 
subscribers per thousands, and is expected to positively attract FDI inflows as the quality is 
improved (see Mai, 2002). The use of this variable is similar to that in Quazi and Mahmud 
(2004)’s study. 
Political instability has been found to have significant negative impact on direct 
investment (Singh & Jun, 1995; Quazi & Mahmud, 2004). The present study proxies this 
variable with the political risk rating developed by International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
Risk is assessed on the comparable basis on twelve component factors such as government 
stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external conflict, 
corruption, military in politics, religion in politics, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic 
accountability and bureaucracy quality (see table 3 for points given to each component). The 
rating ranges from a high of 100 (least risk) to a low of 0 (highest risk). Basically, the index 
represents the degree of stability of a country’s political condition. Therefore, the higher 
ratings are expected to induce greater foreign investment. In other words, the positive 
relationship is expected. 
 
According to the above framework on the determinants of inbound FDI, the study 
constructs a linear model which incorporates two policy variables such as the membership of 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the BIT variable. The former is a binary 
variable which equals 1 starting from the year a country is admitted to APEC membership 
and 0 before then. Of the main interest is the latter to be included to evaluate its partial 
relationship with FDI inflows. BITs hypothesize to function as a signal that the door is 
opened for capital inflows and they are protected. The study calculates this variable as the 
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cumulative number of BITs ratified by a host country throughout the sample period, because 
the treaties are assumed to have long-term effects on FDI (Hallward-Driemeier, 2003). 
However, some already-signed BITs not yet into force are not counted since they may not 
ensure any protection for investors of signatory partner countries. 
The general model is written as follows: 
 
lnFDIit = α0 + δXit-1 +λYit + ψPOLRISKit-1 + α 1 APECit + α 2 BITit-1+ eit (1) 
 
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of real FDI inflows in country i at time t. 
To convert into the real term, each country’s FDI inflows over the period are deflated by US 
GDP deflator. The bilateral inflows are not used due to the assumption that BITs are expected 
to signal to not only the investors of the signatory countries, but the business community 
worldwide. 
The independent variables include a vector of economic variables (Xit-1), a vector of 
social variables (Yit), a political risk variable (POLRISKit-1), a policy variable (APECit) which 
represents a membership of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the variable of interest 
(BITit-1). As discussed earlier, a vector of economic variables is composed of GDP growth 
(GDPGit-1), the logarithm of GDP per capita (lnGDPCit-1), the change in real exchange rate 
(RERit-1), inflation (INFit-1), and openness (OPENit-1) while a vector of social variables 
includes the logarithm of real wage (lnRWAGEit), communication infrastructure proxy 
(INFRAit), and real interest rate (RINTERESTit). The political risk (POLRISKit-1) is the 
measure of political stability in a country. 
The study uses panel data of 10 Asian countries over the period 1984-2002. Those 
counties are China, Hong Kong (China), India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, and Thailand. 
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It is possible that the model employed have endogeneity problems. Specifically, among 
the economic variables, the reverse causality between GDP growth and FDI inflows is 
generally emphasized in the growth literature (see Carkovic & Levine, 2002; Nunnenkamp & 
Spatz, 2003). Further, Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005) suggest that firms may encourage 
the government of their home countries to sign BITs with the government of the countries 
where their investments are located. Hence, it is evident that the reverse causality between 
BIT and FDI may also occur.  
To avoid the endogeneity problems, we use lag of economic variables, the political risk 
variable and BIT. Most of the variables are similar to those used by Neumayer and Spess 
(2005). However, we exclude two variables, GDP and resource rent, from the model 
employed in their study. GDP is excluded due to suspicion of high correlation between GDP 
and GDP per capita. As observed in their results, GDP and GDP per capita, both of which are 
expected to have positive signs, show significant reverse signs in most specifications. The 
resource rent is dropped in our regressions due to unavailability of resource data. Unlike 
Neumayer and Spess (2005), we add three social variables, including wage rate, cost of 
capital and infrastructure development. The social variables are not lagged under the 
assumption that they are exogenously determined.2 We also control for the attractiveness of 
countries as APEC members. 
The variable of interest, BIT, is expected to have a positive relationship with FDI 
inflows. To investigate the different impacts of BITs signed with OECD countries and 
non-OECD countries, BIT is decomposed into BITs signed with OECD countries (BITOECD) 
and BITs signed with non-OECD countries (BITother). 
In order to test our hypothesis that BITs work as a more credible signal in a riskier 
country, the interaction term between bilateral investment treaties and political risk 
(BIT*POLRISK) is added to the above general model. The negative sign of the coefficient is 
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expected. Another implication of this negative interaction term is that the effect of BIT 
diminishes as the country becomes less risky. However, if the positive sign turns out, this 
demonstrates the complementary role of BIT to the political stability of a country. The model 
becomes: 
 
 lnFDIit = β0 + δXit-1 +λYit + ψPOLRISKit-1 + β1 APECit + β2 BITit-1 
 +β3 (BITit-1*POLRISKit-1) + uit (2) 
 
The models are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects (FE), and 
Random Effects (RE) methods with White cross-section standard errors to correct for 
heteroskedasticity in the error term. The fixed effects method is performed in suspicion that 
there are other factors than those captured in our explanatory variables affecting the inflows 
of FDI. And the random effects method, with Wallace and Hussain estimator component 
variances, is used under the assumption that those unobserved factors are randomly captured 
in the error term. 
The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1 and the correlations among variables 
are reported in Table 2 to check multicolinearity problems. Actually, the data of some 
variables in some years are missing; they are ignored in the regressions without causing any 
bias on the estimators in the random sample (Wooldridge, 2003). 
The data are extracted from UNCTAD time-series database from WIR annex tables, 
World Bank World Development Indicators Online (2005), IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 
CD-ROM (2005), ILO: LABORSTA3, Taiwan Statistical Year Book and Taiwan Statistical 
Data Book (2003) and (2004) and UNCTAD Online, BITs databases (2005). 
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Results and Discussions 
Table 4 presents the summary of a general analysis using pooled OLS estimations. First 
of all, we tried to obtain a consistent and reliable model to explain the determinants of 
inbound FDI in Asia. Regression (1.1) is the baseline model in which the variable of interest, 
BIT, is not included. The result indicates that the three categories including economic 
variables, social variables, and political variable, have significant relationship with FDI 
although not all variables are statistically significant. 
Economic variables, GDP growth and GDP per capita, both of which proxy for market 
size, are found to be positive and significant at the 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. 
This implies that the economic growth and the per capita income of people in Asian countries 
exert positive influence on the level of FDI inflows. In addition, the coefficient of openness 
indicates that the more open the economy is, the higher the level of FDI flows into that 
country. However, among all the economic variables included in the baseline model, change 
in real exchange rate and inflation, are insignificant, but they have the expected signs as 
discussed earlier.  
Among the three social variables, real wage and infrastructure quality are found to be 
the significant determinants of inbound FDI in the sample countries while real interest rate 
which proxies for the cost of capital have the consistent negative relationship with FDI, but it 
is not statistically significant in the estimation regression. In short, the result is consistent 
with the fact that low labor cost in Asia is one of competitive factors in promoting FDI 
inflows. 
Political risk rating which is used as a proxy for the political variable in this study also 
confirm the finding of Singh and Jun (1995) and Ok (2004) who argue that political 
instability is an impediment to FDI inflows. As the index measures the stability in a country, 
the positive coefficient implies that a more stable country seems to be competitive in 
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receiving foreign investment. Above all, the variable capturing the effect of regional 
economic integration on FDI is also significant in the regression result. Thus, being a member 
of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is attractive to foreign investors. 
Regression (1.2) was estimated by excluding the insignificant variables found in 
Regression (1.1). The probability of F-statistic4 fails to reject the null hypothesis that real 
exchange rate, inflation, and real interest rate are not jointly significant at the 5 percent level. 
In particular, the finding in Regression (1.2) is robustly consistent with that obtained in 
Regression (1.1); thus, we employ Regression (1.2) as a reliable model to analyze various 
consequences of BITs and test our hypothesized expectations. 
Overall, Regression (1.3) and (1.4) provide evidence that BITs significantly induce the 
inflows of FDI. The positive and significant coefficient of BIT in Regression (1.3) implies 
that as countries continue to ratify more BITs, they are likely to receive larger amount of FDI. 
This important implication confirms the case of China, which has ratified about 50 BITs with 
both OECD and non-OECD countries from 1990 to 2002. However, while the study 
decomposes BITs into BITOECD and BITother (shown in Regression (1.4)), the finding further 
indicates that BITs signed and ratified with OECD countries are significantly effective while 
those with non-OECD countries are of little importance. This seems to lend support for the 
research design in Neumayer and Spess (2005)’s study. We will come to this point later when 
we discuss the consequences of BITs, especially those of BITs with OECD and non-OECD 
countries more explicitly. 
Table 2 shows that lnGDPC is highly correlated with lnRWAGE, OPEN, INFRA, and 
POLRISK in which the correlation coefficient is equal to 0.944, 0.782, 0.808, and 0.702, 
respectively. Hence, a sensitivity test is conducted by excluding lnGDPC from the 
regressions. The results are reported in Table 5. It is indicative that the signs and significance 
of all coefficients do not change except that BITother becomes significant at the 10 percent 
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level. Another indication is that the coefficient of lnRWAGE seems to add up the effect of 
lnGDPC while the magnitudes of OPEN and POLRISK slightly increase. Therefore, 
excluding lnGDPC from the regression equations may result in omitted variable bias rather 
than multicolinearity problems. 
A step further is to include the interaction term between BIT and POLRISK in the 
Regression (1.3) as specified in Model (2) in the previous section in order to test a general 
theoretical expectation of BITs. The model was estimated using pooled OLS, fixed effects 
(FE), and random effects (RE) methods in which the last two is to deal with the effects of 
unobserved variables. F-test and Hausman test were performed in order to choose the most 
favorable method. The results are presented in Table 6. 
The statistics from the tests, both F-statistic and Chi-squares statistic, show that the 
random effects method is more efficient in explaining the variation of FDI. However, it is 
also observed that all coefficients are consistent and comparable across the three methods, 
except for openness which has a negative sign in the fixed effects method; however, it is 
insignificant. Above all, regardless of the methods used, the results confirm the theoretical 
expectation. 
The result from the random effects estimation shows that all the control variables are 
consistent with the general analysis although the coefficient of OPEN is not statistically 
significant. In particular, the negative sign of the interaction term is consistent with the 
prediction of BITs that BITs are more efficient tools to strengthen the credibility of a riskier 
developing country’s commitment to protect foreign investors. Another implication that we 
can derive from the result is that the effect of BITs diminishes with the political stability.  
To recall, the result from Regression (1.4) in Table 4 showed that BITs signed with 
OECD countries are beneficial while BITs signed with non-OECD countries are of little 
benefit. If this is the case, why should developing Asian and Pacific countries put much effort 
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in negotiating, signing, and ratifying BITs among countries? (see Figure 3). China, for 
example, has ratified approximately 40 BITs signed with non-OECD countries among some 
50 BITs ratified during the 1990s. Therefore at this stage, we examine the hypothesis of BIT 
theory more explicitly by separately investigating the possible consequences of BITOECD and 
BITother. 
Since the random effects estimation is more efficient in the above analysis, the study 
reports only the results of the random effects method in Table 7 below. However, the 
Hausman statistic is also reported to confirm the robustness of the estimates over the 
estimates of the fixed effects method. Table 7 shows the conditional impacts of BITOECD and 
BITother, separately. On the whole, we can confirm the theoretical expectation only in the case 
of BITother while BITOECD works unconditionally on the political risk of a nation. 
According to the result of Regression (2.4), BITOECD is statistically significant and has 
the positive sign. This lends a stronger support for signing and ratifying BITs with OECD 
countries. The result is in line with Neumayer and Spess (2005) who find that signing more 
BITs with OECD countries raise the amount of FDI flows to developing countries. However, 
the result does not support the theoretical predictions of the role of BITs in this case. Though 
the coefficient of the interaction term between BITOECD and POLRISK has the expected 
negative sign, it is not statistically significant. In short, the result implies that BITs with 
OECD countries may be effective irrespective of the political condition of a nation. 
On the contrary, BITs with non-OECD countries function as a substitute for the 
political condition of a nation. The coefficients of BITother and its interaction term with 
POLRISK have the expected sign and are significant at the 5 and 10 percent level, 
respectively. However, in this regression, we do not control for the effects of BITOECD. With 
suspicion that BITother is a complement to BITOECD, Regression (2.6) shows the result with the 
interaction between BITOECD and BITother. The coefficient of BITother is negative and 
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significant at the 1 percent level while that of the interaction term is positive and also 
statistically significant. That is, BITother seems to work; however, depending on BITOECD or 
the result can be interpreted that BITother adds more impacts to the overall effects of BITOECD. 
The results seem to contradict the fact that FDI between developing countries are rare 
as pointed out by Neumayer and Spess (2005). Likewise, it sounds unusual if BITs between 
developing countries work. One possible explanation of the result is that signing massive 
BITs with non-OECD countries is a strong signal not only to developing signatories, but to 
the business community worldwide of the government’s commitment to provide stable legal 
investment framework. Therefore, their effects should not be neglected. 
To sum up, the above regression results suggest that BITs are definitely a credible 
signal to foreign investors. In addition, we also find evidence to confirm the theoretical 
predictions of BITs. Although the conditional effects of BITOECD are not significantly proved, 
the absolute effects are strongly found. In particular, while we find the significant substitute 
effects of BITother for POLRISK and the positive interaction term between BITOECD and 
BITother , it is conclusive that both BITOECD and BITother are effective as complement to each 
other and they work not only bilaterally, but worldwide, too. 
The above results have shown the significant conditional effects of BITs on FDI 
inflows. As Model (2) allows us to compute the growth of FDI under a specific condition of 
political stability, the study derived the first-order condition with respect to BIT from Model 
(2) which is written as follows: 
 
 ( ) BITPOLRISK
FDI
FDI ∂+=∂ *32 ββ  (3)  
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Using the political risk rating in the year 2004, we estimated the ceteris-paribus effects 
of ratifying one additional BIT on FDI inflows into some South, East, and South-East Asian 
nations. Table 8 reports the results. 
 Column (1) and column (2) are the growth of FDI from an additional ratified BIT 
and BIT with non-OECD countries, respectively. The figures in column (1) were obtained by 
plugging the coefficients of BIT and its interaction term of Regression (2.3) into Model (3) 
above, and those in column (2) were calculated in the same way, using the coefficients of 
Regression (2.5). The t-statistic of this partial effect is calculated using the Delta method. The 
results indicate that the predicted FDI inflows in the year 2005 may average around 2.3 
percent when a country in South, East, and South-East Asia ratifies an additional treaty, given 
that other factors are constant. 
Among the three regions, the magnitude is higher in South Asia, averaging about 3.7 
percent (see column (1)). That is, one BIT ratified by a country in South Asia significantly 
increase FDI inflows by 3.7 percent. Even though with some internal or external conflicts 
which occurred in some South Asian countries such as Sri Lanka and Pakistan, those 
countries still have the potential to induce foreign investment by 3.5 and 4.1 percent, 
respectively through signing and ratifying one more BIT. Additionally, the t-statistics in 
column (2) indicate that BITs with non-OECD countries are also effective. However, the 
larger magnitude of 3.9 percent may incorporate the effects of BITs with OECD nations as 
their effects are not controlled in the regression estimation. 
In East Asia, according to a rather stable political condition, an additional BIT ratified 
can stimulate only around 1.5 percent of FDI inflows. Among the five countries estimated in 
the region, the t-statistics indicate that only China and Mongolia have potential to sign BITs; 
however, BITs with non-OECD countries seem not be effective in all countries in East Asia. 
China is able to attract around 1.9 percent of FDI with one BIT ratified. As Tobin and 
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Rose-Ackerman (2005) excludes China from the sample, this may lose important information 
of BIT effects as China was the third top country to conclude BITs as of 2000 (UNCTAD, 
2000). The implication for the insignificant effects of BITs in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South 
Korea is probably that the quality of institutions and compliance of the laws are sufficiently 
trustworthy. 
In South-East Asian countries, FDI is predicted to increase by an average of about 2 
percent with an additional BIT ratified. Among them, BITs seem to have no effect in Brunei 
and Singapore. Like Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea, this also implies that the quality 
of institutions and the compliance of laws are good enough to ensure a safe investment in 
those countries. Reversely, the figures for Indonesia and Myanmar suggest that these 
countries have higher potential among South-East Asian countries to attract FDI inflows with 
an additional ratification of BIT. On the other hand, BITs with non-OECD countries are not 
significant in four countries including Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. 
 
Conclusions 
The study analyzes the effects of bilateral investment treaties on foreign investment in 
Asian countries. Based on the empirical background of several studies on the determinants of 
FDI inflows, a linear model is constructed including the sample of 10 Asian countries from 
1984 to 2002. In summary, the results robustly confirm our theoretical expectation of BIT. 
By controlling for several factors discussed in the literature of foreign direct 
investment, this study provides evidence that BITs play a significant role in stimulating the 
inflows of investment. A further analysis indicates that signing a treaty with OECD countries 
is beneficial while signing BITs with non-OECD countries seem not to gain any significance. 
The results are in line with those of Neumayer and Spess (2005), who find significant 
relationship between BITs signed with OECD countries and FDI inflows.  
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Testing the theoretical expectation of BITs, BITs signed with OECD countries and 
BITs signed with non-OECD countries, the finding generally indicates that countries with 
higher political risk seem to be better able to receive more FDI with BIT ratification. While 
the effects of BITs with OECD nations are not likely to depend on the quality of political 
condition, those of BITs with non-OECD countries might be likely to. A further analysis 
indicates that the effects of BITs with non-OECD countries are complement to those of BITs 
with OECD countries. As BITs are viewed as the commitment of a host country to provide a 
stable legal framework to investors, signing BITs is a signal to not only signatory countries, 
but also the international business community. The results conclude that the commitment is 
credible even with BITs signed with non-OECD countries although conditional on BITs 
signed with OECD countries. Thus, a message to a developing country is that a BIT is really 
worth negotiating, signing, ratifying, and complying. 
 In addition, using 2004 political risk data, the study provides evidence that an 
additional BIT ratified raises FDI inflows by an average of 2.3 percent in South, East, and 
South-East Asian nations. It is evident that BITs are effective in most countries in Asia, but 
they are of little importance in Brunei, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan.  
 Lastly, the overall findings in this study add to the literature on the determinants of 
FDI. As shown in the empirical results, the market size, political stability, the quality of 
infrastructure, wage, the degree of openness, APEC membership are the important factors for 
stimulating FDI inflows. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Number of BITs concluded per year and cumulative 1990-2004 
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(Source: UNCTAD, BITs databases) 
 
 
Figure 2: Cumulative BITs signed by 10 Asian countries 
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Source: UNCTAD database on BITs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
Figure 3: BITs signed between developing countries, by regions and decades, 1960-99 
 
Source: UNCTAD database on BITs 
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Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Description Unit Min Max Mean Median Standard Error Obs. 
FDI Real FDI (constant 2000) Million US $ -4,550 61,939 5,716 2,265 10,592 190 
GDPG Real GDP growth Percentage change -56.25 44.59 5.37 7.35 11.51 190 
GDPC Real GDP per capita US $ 240 24,939 6,205 2,101 7,292 190 
RER Change in real exchange rate Percentage change -33.47 120.68 2.41 0.85 12.47 187 
INF Inflation (CPI) Percentage change -3.96 58.39 5.76 4.78 6.36 188 
OPEN Openness Ratio of trade to GDP 0.10 3.28 1.03 0.66 0.86 190 
RWAGE Real wage (constant 2000) US $ 28.50 1,761.06 595.91 370.65 553.84 166 
INFRA Phone subscribers per thousands Per 1,000 people 2.68 1,507.13 275.08 125.18 332.82 190 
RINTEREST Real interest rate Percentage -24.60 21.61 5.86 5.91 4.87 179 
POLRISK Political risk rating Index 33.00 90.00 65.54 67.00 12.52 187 
BIT Bilateral investment treaties Cumulative number 0.00 73.00 15.91 11.00 16.66 190 
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Table 2: Correlation among Variables 
 
 lnFDI GDPG lnGDPC RER INF OPEN lnWAGE INFRA RINTEREST POLRISK APEC BITS 
lnFDI 1.000             
GDPG 0.204  1.000            
lnGDPC 0.324  0.133  1.000           
RER -0.167  -0.809  -0.144 1.000          
INF -0.273  -0.266  -0.366 0.386  1.000         
OPEN 0.402  0.083  0.782  -0.094 -0.301 1.000        
lnWAGE 0.139  0.134  0.944  -0.172 -0.394 0.658  1.000       
INFRA 0.418  -0.026  0.808  -0.044 -0.343 0.610  0.765  1.000      
RINTEREST -0.103  -0.111  -0.089 0.035  0.081  -0.074 0.054  -0.001  1.000     
POLRISK 0.497  0.054  0.702  -0.064 -0.499 0.586  0.610  0.616  -0.193  1.000    
APEC 0.540  0.060  0.303  -0.014 -0.025 0.224  0.299  0.404  -0.053  0.289  1.000  
BITS 0.544  -0.025  -0.025 0.104  0.022  -0.077 -0.107  0.171  -0.089  0.216  0.521 1.000 
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Table 3: ICRG’s Political Risk Rating.  
 
POLITICAL RISK COMPONENTS  
Sequence  Component  Max. points  
A Government Stability  12 
B Socioeconomic Conditions  12 
C Investment Profile  12 
D  Internal Conflict  12 
E  External Conflict  12 
F  Corruption  6 
G  Military in Politics  6 
H  Religion in Politics  6 
I  Law and Order  6 
J  Ethnic Tensions  6 
K  Democratic Accountability  6 
L  Bureaucracy Quality  4 
Total 100 
  Source: http://www.icrgonline.com 
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Table 4: Summary of General Analysis (OLS) 
Dependent Variable: the logarithm of real FDI inflows 
Independent 
Variables Reg. (1.1) Reg. (1.2) Reg. (1.3) Reg. (1.4) 
Constant 22.010 
(22.681)*** 
20.804 
(28.950)*** 
20.341 
(29.594)*** 
19.449 
(26.243)*** 
GDPG 0.022 
(1.995)** 
0.024 
(2.555)** 
0.019 
(2.229)** 
0.018 
(2.066)** 
lnGDPC 0.673 
(3.461)*** 
0.787 
(4.681)*** 
0.809 
(5.807)*** 
0.958 
(7.288)*** 
RER  0.003 
(0.241) 
___ ___ ___ 
INF -0.028 
(-1.028) 
___ ___ ___ 
OPEN 0.342 
(2.488)** 
0.330 
(2.647)*** 
0.492 
(3.687)*** 
0.334 
(2.443)** 
lnRWAGE -1.571 
(-11.59)*** 
-1.644 
(-14.43)*** 
-1.418 
(-14.22)*** 
-1.438 
(-16.25)*** 
INFRA 0.002 
(4.816)*** 
0.002 
(4.315)*** 
0.001 
(2.603)** 
0.001 
(2.281)** 
RINTEREST -0.033 
(-1.279) 
___ ___ 
 
___ 
 
POLRISK 0.028 
(2.772)*** 
0.036 
(6.815)*** 
0.019 
(3.106)*** 
0.017 
(2.650)*** 
APEC 1.438 
(6.879)*** 
1.343 
(7.257)*** 
0.841 
(4.761)*** 
0.767 
(4.611)*** 
BIT ___ ___ 0.030 
(7.298)*** 
___ 
BITOECD ___ ___ ___ 0.079 
(5.854)*** 
BITother ___ ___ ___ 0.004 
(0.613) 
Adj.R-squared 0.641 0.633 0.706 0.724 
Observations 142 150 150 150 
Note: Figures in parenthesis are t-statistic. *** denotes significance at 1% and ** at 5%. 
 Heteroskedasticity is corrected (White cross-section standard errors & covariance). 
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Table 5: Sensitivity Test (OLS) 
 
Dependent Variable: the logarithm of real FDI inflows 
Independent 
Variables Reg. (1.5) Reg. (1.6) Reg. (1.7) Reg. (1.8) 
Constant 23.444 
(26.486)*** 
22.545 
(42.476)*** 
22.137 
(39.097)*** 
21.767 
(33.903)*** 
GDPG 0.024 
(2.214)** 
0.026 
(2.830)*** 
0.022 
(2.496)** 
0.021 
(2.420)** 
RER  0.004 
(0.326) 
___ ___ ___ 
INF -0.023 
(-0.845) 
___ ___ ___ 
OPEN 0.552 
(5.960)*** 
0.596 
(6.548)*** 
0.765 
(7.561)*** 
0.693 
(6.488)** 
lnRWAGE -1.054 
(-11.14)*** 
-1.025 
(-11.56)*** 
-0.785 
(-8.752)*** 
-0.721 
(-7.192)*** 
INFRA 0.002 
(6.060)*** 
0.002 
(5.800)*** 
0.001 
(3.896)*** 
0.001 
(3.724)*** 
RINTEREST -0.040 
(-1.454) 
___ ___ 
 
___ 
 
POLRISK 0.037 
(3.612)*** 
0.044 
(7.809)*** 
0.027 
(4.446)*** 
0.027 
(4.228)*** 
APEC 1.392 
(6.647)*** 
1.261 
(6.369)*** 
0.763 
(4.003)*** 
0.705 
(3.794)*** 
BIT ___ ___ 0.030 
(6.697)*** 
___ 
BITOECD ___ ___ ___ 0.062 
(4.669)*** 
BITother ___ ___ ___ 0.013 
(1.892)* 
Adj.R-squared 0.625 0.605 0.675 0.682 
Observations 142 150 150 150 
Note: Figures in parenthesis are t-statistic. *** denotes significance at 1% and ** at 5%. 
 Heteroskedasticity is corrected (White cross-section standard errors & covariance). 
 lnGDPC is excluded due to high correlation between lnGDPC and other variables including  
 OPEN, lnRWAGE, INFRA, and POLRISK. 
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Table 6: Conditional Effects of BIT 
Dependent Variable: the logarithm of real FDI inflows 
Independent Variables Reg. (2.1) (OLS) 
Reg. (2.2) 
(FE) 
Reg. (2.3) 
(RE) 
Constant 19.819 
(27.851)*** 
___ 19.345 
(14.509)*** 
GDPG 0.014 
(1.679)* 
0.016 
(1.718)* 
0.015 
(1.766)* 
lnGDPC 0.669 
(5.414)*** 
0.870 
(2.349)** 
0.635 
(3.471)*** 
OPEN 0.499 
(3.967)** 
-0.584 
(-1.065) 
0.221 
(0.806) 
lnRWAGE -1.253 
(-11.783)*** 
-0.995 
(-5.519)*** 
-1.105 
(-8.292)*** 
INFRA 0.001 
(2.992)*** 
0.001 
(2.193)** 
0.001 
(2.454)** 
POLRISK 0.029 
(4.003)*** 
0.037 
(3.923)*** 
0.034 
(3.821)*** 
APEC 0.805 
(4.656)*** 
0.863 
(3.169)*** 
0.831 
(3.924)*** 
BIT  0.154 
(4.505)*** 
 0.076 
(2.494)** 
0.0946 
(2.826)*** 
BIT*POLRISK -0.0018 
(-3.471)*** 
-0.0009 
(-1.882)* 
-0.00107 
(-2.034)** 
Adj.R2 0.720 0.772 0.788 
Observations 150 150 150 
F-test (F-statistic)  4.089  
Hausman Test (Chisq-statistic)   6.075 
Note: Figures in parenthesis are t-statistic. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% 
 Heteroskedasticity is corrected (White cross-section standard errors & covariance). 
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Table 7: Conditional Effects of BITOECD and BITother (GLS) 
Dependent Variable: the logarithm of real FDI inflows 
Independent Variables Reg. (2.4) (RE) 
Reg. (2.5) 
(RE) 
Reg. (2.6) 
(RE) 
Constant 17.997 
   (12.734)*** 
19.432 
   (12.416)*** 
18.052 
(14.916)*** 
GDPG 0.014 
  (1.729)* 
0.016 
 (1.797)* 
  0.012 
 (1.277) 
lnGDPC 0.761 
    (4.895)*** 
0.723 
   (3.101)*** 
0.932 
(5.191)*** 
OPEN 0.049 
(0.199) 
0.066 
(0.196) 
-0.048 
(-0.187) 
lnRWAGE -0.975 
   (-5.599)*** 
-1.208 
  (-9.187)*** 
 -1.204 
(-9.776)*** 
INFRA 0.001 
(1.510) 
0.001 
   (2.952)*** 
0.001 
 (1.961)* 
POLRISK 0.029 
  (2.604)** 
0.035 
   (4.344)*** 
  0.031 
 (3.543)*** 
APEC 0.712 
   (3.565)*** 
0.953 
   (4.350)*** 
  1.002 
(4.245)*** 
BITOECD 0.1995 
  (2.462)** 
___   0.064 
 (3.091)*** 
BITOECD*POLRISK -0.0017 
(-1.393) 
___ ___ 
BITother ___ 0.116 
 (2.324)** 
-0.096 
(-2.697)*** 
BITother*POLRISK ___ -0.0014 
(-1.810)* 
___ 
 
BITOECD*BITother ___ ___   0.004 
(2.919)*** 
Adj. R2 0.797 0.774 0.808 
Observations 150 150 150 
Hausman test (Chisq-stat) 7.244 6.816 14.679 
Note: Figures in parenthesis are t-statistic. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% 
 Heteroskedasticity is corrected (White cross-section standard errors & covariance). 
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Table 8: Predicted Impacts of BIT in South, East, and South-East Asia in 2005 
Countries Political Risk2004 
FDI
FDI∂  
Due to BIT∂  
(1) 
FDI
FDI∂  
Due to otherBIT∂  
(2) 
South Asia 
Bangladesh 49 0.042    (4.597)***  
0.046 
   (3.594)*** 
India 59.5 0.031    (5.168)*** 
0.030 
   (4.077)*** 
Pakistan 50 0.041    (4.687)*** 
0.044 
   (3.668)*** 
Sri Lanka 55.5 0.035    (5.139)*** 
0.036 
   (4.067)*** 
Average 53.5 0.037    (4.997)*** 
0.039 
   (3.936)*** 
East Asia 
China 70 0.019    (2.785)*** 
0.015 
(1.606) 
Hong Kong, China 78.5 0.010 (1.008) 
0.003 
(0.204) 
Taiwan, China 76 0.013 (1.418) 
0.007 
(0.504) 
South Korea 77 0.012 (1.244) 
0.005 
(0.376) 
Mongolia 71 0.018   (2.518)** 
0.014 
(1.376) 
Average 74.5 0.015  (1.706)* 
0.009 
(0.723) 
South-East Asia 
Brunei Darussalam 82 0.007 (0.555) 
-0.002 
(-0.116) 
Indonesia 51.5 0.039    (4.823)*** 
0.042 
   (3.783)*** 
Malaysia 71.5 0.018  (2.390)**
0.013 
(1.269) 
Myanmar 47 0.044    (4.423)*** 
0.048 
   (3.456)*** 
Philippines 66 0.024    (3.936)*** 
0.021 
  (2.700)*** 
Singapore 83.5 0.005 (0.395) 
-0.004 
(-0.226) 
Thailand 72 0.017   (2.266)** 
0.012 
(1.167) 
Vietnam 65 0.025   (4.214)***
0.023 
  (2.992)*** 
Average 67.3 0.022    (3.559)*** 
0.019 
  (2.322)** 
Group Average 66.2 0.023    (3.879)*** 
0.021 
   (2.642)*** 
Note: Figures in parenthesis are t-statistic. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% 
 
35 
 
                                                          
* I would like to thank Donghun Kim and Yuqing Xing for their useful comments on the first draft of this 
paper. This paper does not reflect the stance of the International University of Japan. The remaining 
mistakes are all mine. 
1 Political risk index ranges from 0 (highest risk) to 100 (least risk). 
2 The endogeneity of wage and infrastructure are rarely mentioned in the literature of FDI (see also 
Janicki & Wunnava, 2004; Loree & Guisinger, 1995; Mai, 2002; Quazi and Mahmud, 2004; Singh & Jun, 
1995). 
3 The data used in the regression estimation is on a monthly basis. So, the data obtained from ILO were 
converted as follows: 
The daily earning was multiplied by 30.42; weekly wage was multiplied by 4.35. 
4 F(1.128) = 0.34; with a degree of freedom equal to 3, 131. 
 
